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AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNIQUES TO
PRESERVE OPEN SPACEfI
PETER AMES EVELETH*
Looking ten years into the future, what do you anticipate for your
community? If the present trend continues unchecked, what is it likely to

become? A vacationer will wind his way through a gaudy, seemingly endless
jungle of neon-lit honkytonks. On every conceivable inch of space buildings will be so tightly packed the Lake will be concealed from view.

Ugliness is out of place here, and business has a responsibility to
see that the mistakes of the few are not allowed to destroy the beauty
of our land and its tremendous dollar potential. Garish, trashy honkytonks are in keeping with the surroundings of Coney Island - and
in Lake George Park they are ugly, and ugliness is bad business.1

THE PRESERVATION

of open space is no longer just good
conversation practice; it is good business. It is no mere coincidence
that the recent efforts of the business community in the drive for open
space have been accompanied by a spurt of legislative activity on both
the state and national levels. The question is not that open space is
t This article is based on a paper written in conjunction with the Land Development and City Planning Seminar at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
conducted by Associate Professor Jan Z. Krasnowiecki. The writer wishes to acknowledge his appreciation for the critical assistance of Professor Val Nolan, Jr., Indiana
University School of Law and to Mr. Edward J. Monroe, Chairman, Lake George
Park Commission for materials he provided concerning the operation of the commission.
* Teaching Associate, Indiana University School of Law; B.S. 1961 Cornell
University; LL.B., 1964 University of Pennsylvania.
1. Address by L. Judson Morehouse, Chairman, New York Republican State
Committee, to members of the Lake George Chamber of Commerce, September 23,
1962. Mr. Morehouse is chiefly responsible for the creation of the Lake George Park
Commission which is discussed, infra. His assessment of American honkytonk is in
accord with the view of Eric Sevareid who sees the United States as "the most
affluent slum on earth": The Sunday Bulletin (Philadelphia), News and Views, Jan.
12, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
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sufficiently attractive to the prospective homebuyer to justify its preservation ;2 for state legislatures, despite the reticence of some courts, have
determined that such areas are "necessary to human welfare and happiness". 8 This happy condition, however, has created a most difficult task
for the planner and the lawyer who must now select the most efficacious
4
techniques for acquiring and preserving this country's open areas.
The problems of selection are complicated by the varied and sometimes conflicting purposes that are contained within the concept of open
2. Many subdividers indicate that clusters sell better than the traditional pattern
of development: Huxtable, New York Times (Magazine), Feb. 9, 1964, pp. 37, 42.
3. MD. CODE ANN., art. 81 § 19(b) (1961) (Supp. 1963).
4. In recent years a voluminous amount of material on the open space problem
has been published. The writer has found the following publications to be most useful:
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (Casner ed. 1952) (easements and covenants) ;
Ascher, Private Covenants in Urban Redevelopment, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT:
PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES (Woodbury ed. 1953) (introduction to the
common law property intricacies inherent in the use of private covenants in
subdivisions; discussion of the Radbam, New Jersey restrictions).
CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND (2d ed. 1947)
(a scholarly analysis of this complex area of the law; extensive citation
of authority).
THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961) (not
required reading but a most interesting and controversial study of what

JACOBS,

makes our cities successes or failures).

KRASNOWiEcKI, HOMES ASSOCIATION STUDY (First Draft) (1962)
(An
extensive study of the home owners association with particular emphasis
on federal taxes).
Recreation and Open Space, STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN URBAN REGIONAL

(The Council of State Governments)
duction with current references and bibliography).
DEVELOPMENT

(1962)

(brief intro-

SIEGEL, THE LAW Or OPEN SPACE (Regional Plan Association) (1960)
(particular emphasis on the law of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut;
very comprehensive citation to case authority).
Walker, Land Use and Local Finances, Part I. Land Uses and Values, 27 TAX
POLICY (1960).

Part II. Regulation and Control of Land Use, 28 TAX POLICY (Aug.-Sept.
1961).
Part III. Fiscal Aspects of Land Use, 29 TAX POLICY (July-Aug.-Sept. 1962).
Loopholes in State and Local Taxes, 30 TAX POLICY (Feb.-Mar. 1963)

(these four articles present a concise, current and persuasive discussion of
land use controls and property taxation).
WHYTE, OPEN SPACE ACTION (O.R.R.R.C. Study Report 15) (1962) (current statutory references are reprinted in full in appendices).
NEW APPROACHES TO RESIDENTIAL LAND DEVLOPMENT (Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin 40) (1961) (explanation of cluster developments).
WILLIAMS, LAND ACQUISITION FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS (O.R.R.R.C. Study Report 16)

ANALYSIS OF

(1963) (detailed
analysis of legal problems of government acquisition of open space land with
particular emphasis on the legal and administrative difficulties of easements;
detailed citations).

WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASE-

MENTS (Urban Land Institute, Technical Bull. 36) (1959) (proposal for
scenic easements).
Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the
Urban Fringe, 1961 WIS. L. REv. 370 (summary of the numerous land use
control techniques).
Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservationof Open Space in Metropolitan Areas,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1961) (the authors criticize existing techniques
and propose the compensable regulation as a solution).
Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land (two parts) 28 VA.
L. REV. 951 (1942) (a starting point for anyone who wishes to understand
easements and covenants; the best article in the field).
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space.' If the community simply wishes to encourage open areas around
new subdivisions, then "cluster zoning" may be sufficient. If, rather,
a large regional park is desired, the use of the police power alone will
be inadequate. Condemnation may be required in areas which face
impending development; purchase of scenic easements may suffice in
primarily rural regions. 6
But where are the planner and the lawyer to begin? The planner
must first assess the open space requirements of his community. Then
the lawyer must determine which of the various planning tools have
been made available by the state through enabling legislation. Finally.
7
both must select the correct planning device for each open space need.
This last step in the planning process is most critical for it involves
considerable political judgment as well as technical skill. Most of all,
however, it requires an awareness of the legal limitations inherent in
each of the planning techniques. This paper is directed at that last
step in the procedure.
5. Since the uses of open space are many and varied, there are a number of
different techniques which can be employed to preserve the open areas for each particular need. A partial listing of the needs and the tools that could be used for preservation is illustrative of this diversity:
a. Active recreation: health and pleasure - backyards, vacant lots, neighborhood
parks and rugged wilderness preserves.
b. Passive recreation: aesthetic appreciation - scenic views from the home and
highway.
c. Urban containment: community identification; relief from the "cityscape";
reduction of dirt and noise - buffer strips, "webs of greenery" and "greenbelts."
d. Resource conservation: ecological balance; watertable maintenance; flood and
soil erosion prevention - wildlife and forest preserves, parks, and agricultural
and density zoning.
e. Subdivision development efficiency: reduction of wasteful utility services;
lower housing and government costs - density zoning and building code
restrictions.
f. Timed development for future uses: airports, parks and industry - flexible
zoning, limited term development easements, option and official maps.
g. Preservation of distinctive areas: educational, historic, architectural and
geological areas - zoning, purchase, condemnation and private restoration
and preservation.
See generally

REGIONAL

PARKS

AND

OPEN

SPACE:

SELECTED

CONFERENCE

(University of California) 12-14, 82 (1961) (hereinafter California
Conference) ; Comment 37 So. CALIF. L. Rnv. 304 (1964) ; STRONG, OPEN
SPACE FOR THE PENJERDEL REGION (Workshop I) 11-2 to 11-6 (1961);
Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan
Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 180 (1961). For a less charitable view
toward the desirability of city parks, see JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE
or GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
6. Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 5, at 180-81 n. 5; STRONG, op. cit. supra note 5,
at (Workshop I) 11-1 to 11-3.
7. The Federal Housing Act of 1961 specifically recognizes the necessity for
employing a variety of techniques:
In extending financial assistance under this title, the Administrator shall
take such action . . . to assure that local governing bodies are preserving a
maximum of open-space land, with a minimum of cost, through the use of
existing public land; the use of special tax, zoning, and subdivision provisions;
and the continuation of appropriate private use of open-space land through
acquisition and leaseback, the acquisition of restrictive easements, and other
available means. 64 Stat. 558, 42 U.S.C. § 703(b).
PAPERS
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THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of maintaining sufficient open space is presently
limited to several small belts of concentrated population. However, the
current shift of economic activity to the heretofore sparsely populated
areas of the Southwest makes this problem one of national significance.
The total area of land populated by 1000 persons and over, in 1954,
amounted to less than one percent (18.6 Million acres) of the total land
area in the United States;" forests, croplands, and pasture occupied
over ninety percent. 9 In the continental United States population
density varies greatly - from 1.5 persons per square mile in Nevada
to 88 thousand per square mile in Manhattan." Furthermore, demographers predict that most of the future increase will be concentrated in
areas where a town or city now exists." While the federal government's actions have had mixed effect on population movement, the
changing nature of defense technology has resulted in some deep regional
and local dislocations of employment and population.'" Undoubtedly
the great concern with the Appalachian problem will lead to additional
shifts of industry into that area. An even more direct federal solution
might lie in the active promotion of "New Towns," new communities
built under the aegis of the government on lands now held in the
public domain since over twenty-five percent of the continental United
States is in public ownership.'" While the government holds over
ninety percent of the land in some areas of the West, the percentage
is much lower in the eastern region where the open space problem is
more acute. In 1950, the federal government owned two percent of
New Jersey and Pennsylvania and three percent of Delaware.Y
But neither population increase nor high density concentration is,
in itself, the primary cause of the disappearance of usable open space.
The real reason seems to be the inefficient manner in which land is
being developed:
It is not the growth itself that is the problem, but the pattern of
growth. Many acres of open space have been left behind as a result
of scattered development, but much of this is too small or too
poorly sited to use well; it is not effective open space.'"
8. WALKER,

op. cit. supra note 4, at 6.

9. Id. at 4.
tHE
FUTURE 33 (1960).
11. Id. at 111. However, the hardy pioneer can still acquire a five acre homestead
tract for a nominal annual rental of $5: COMMUNITY RECREATION AND THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN (U.S. Dept. of the Interior) 19 (May 1963).
10. CLAWSON, HUD & STODDARD, LAND IVOR

12. LEVITAN, FEDERAL MANPOWER POLICIES AND
PLOYMENT (W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment

PROGRAMS

TO COMBAT UNEM-

Research) 3 (Feb. 1964).

13. WALKER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 7.
14. STRONG, (Workshop I), op. cit. supra note 5, at 1-3.
15. Recreation and Open Space, STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN URBAN
DEVELOPMENT (The Council of State Governments) 145-46 (1962).
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Even in our more crowded cities, such as New York and Chicago,
over ten percent of the land is left vacant. This land is unsuitable for
park and recreation purposes, not only because of its size and location,
but because the chain of title to the land is hopelessly confused.
I.
GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION:
AND EMINENT

A.

PURCHASE

DOMAIN

Acquisition of the Fee Simple

Having assessed the need for open space areas in their community,
the planner and lawyer must then select the legal tools to preserve it.
The acquisition of the fee is the most frequently employed device.

While there has never been substantial doubt that governments have
the constitutional capacity to purchase or use their power of eminent
domain for park and recreation purposes, 6 there has been some question of how far in advance of their immediate needs they may condemn
land.17 Generally, advance acquisition has been upheld, particularly if
pursuant to a comprehensive community plan. 8
It has long been settled that the federal government may acquire
land for park and recreational purposes. 9 While the states also possess
such powers, 20 they have used them less extensively in recent decades.
In the last few years there has been a flood of state legislation which
specifically authorizes and encourages the purchase and/or condemnation of land -

including less than fee interests

-

by local govern-

ments for park, conservation, open space and recreation purposes.
These states include those most concerned with the open space problem, such as New York, New Jersey, California, Maryland, Connecticut and Massachusetts. 2 ' New Jersey has already acquired over
16. 10

MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28.51 (3d ed. 1950) and cases
in WILLIAMS, LAND ACQUISITION FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION ANALYSIS OF
SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS (O.R.R.R.C. Study Report 16) 2-7 (1963), and SIEGEL,
THg LAW OF OPEN SPACE 3 (Regional Plan Association) (1960).

cited

17. See, for example, Grand Rapids Bd. of Educ. v. Baczewski, 340 Mich. 265,
65 N.W. 2d 810 (1954) (schools not needed for 30 years; acquisition of land for sites
did not meet necessity test).
18. Carlor Co., Inc. v. City of Miami, 62 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1953), cert. den., 346
U.S. 821, 74 S.Ct. 37 (1954) (upheld taking land for airport not needed in near
future); Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1622,
1634 (1962).
19. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 13 S.Ct. 361 (1893) ; United
States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 16 S.Ct. 427 (1896).
20. See cases cited in Shoemaker v. United States, supra note 19, at 297.
21. CALIF. GOVT. CODE 12 §§ 6950-6954 (1959), § 7000 (1963) (state eminent
domain) ; CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN. tit. 7 § 7-131 (C) (1963) ; 3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7
§ 4703 (a) (1) (state eminent domain) ; MD. CODE ANN. art. 66(c) § 357(A) (Supp.
1960); IB MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 40 § 8(C) (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8A-1
(1961)

(including eminent domain); N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW §§ 1-0701, 1-0708

(neighborhood parks of two acres or more) (1960 as amended 1964); N.Y. GEN.
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14,000 acres at a cost of $5.8 million since it initiated its Green Acres
program in 1961.22

The most serious obstacle to governmental acquisition has usually
been a lack of local financial resources; little state assistance has been
available. In 1960, less than two percent (less than $6 million) of the
funds spent by local authorities for park and recreation purposes came
from the states.23 This need should in part be ameliorated by recent
bond issues in New York ($100 million),

24

New Jersey ($60 million), 2

5

million). 2 6

and Pennsylvania ($70
Wisconsin financed a $50 million
These programs
program through a one cent cigarette tax increase
provide for considerable assistance to local governments. For example,
Pennsylvania's "Project 70" authorizes $20 million for matching grants
to regional county and municipal authorities; New York furnishes aid
of up to 75% of acquisition costs, and Wisconsin and New Jersey both
50%. There are, in addition, numerous other sources of revenue available for open space and related programs.2" In Pennsylvania all state
revenue from oil and gas leases is allocated for conservation, recreation
and flood control purposes. 2' Adequate enabling legislation to authorize
bond issues by local governments now exists; however, it is rarely
utilized. Evidently there is great reluctance to create bonded debt.s"
Finally, the federal government initiated its first open space
program in Title VII of the Housing Act of 1961." It authorizes
grants of up to 30% of the cost of permanent interests in open space
land (predominately undeveloped land in urban areas) which has value
for park, recreation, scenic, historic and conservation purposes.
Even where there are adequate monies available to finance an
extensive land acquisition program, however, some commentators have
expressed serious doubt whether public ownership is an appropriate
device, especially where the land acquired is not immediately needed
for public use. Aside from the frequent warning against "the governMUN. LAW § 247 (1960).

See also W. VA. CODE Ol 1961 ANN. ch. 20 § 2215 (1961)
(state eminent domain); Wis. STATS. ANN. § 23.09(16) (state authorization).
22. The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia) March 12, 1964, p. 13 (2d ed.).
23. STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN URBAN REGIONAL DEVELOPME'NT, op. cit. supra note

15, at 155.
24. WHYTE, OPEN SPACE ACTION (O.R.R.R.C. Study Report 15) (1962)

(voting
totals at 64-65) ; N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW § 875 (amended 1963).
25. WHYTE, Ibid.
26. Joint Resolution #5, S.B. 45 (1963), approved by voters, 11/4/63.
27. WIS. STATS. ANN. § 23.09 (amended 1961).
28. California Conference, supra note 5, at 21, 65-68.
29. PA. STAT. ANN . tit. 71 § 1331. The Commonwealth is also empowered to
make payments in lieu of taxes lost to counties and townships on lands acquired by
the Commonwealth for conservation or flood prevention. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 §§
5501-5502.
30. STRONG, op. cit. supra note 5 (Workshop II), at 11-20 to 11-21. But there is
also a great deal of public apathy as well. In New York's $75 million open space bond
proposition, 56% of the ballots were blank.

31. 75 Stat. 149.
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ment in the real estate business," one may well question whether a
more rational allocation of resources would not dictate more schools
32
rather than greener highways.
B.

Acquisition of Interests Less Than a Fee:
Development Rights and Scenic Easements

William H. Whyte, Jr., has been the foremost advocate of the
so-called scenic or conservation easement approach to preserve open
space areas.3 3 He suggests that this method has several advantages
over fee acquisition:
1. The land remains on the tax rolls.
2. There are no public maintenance costs.
3. There is less landowner opposition since the owner may remain
in possession.
4. It is less costly than fee acquisition.
5. The land remains in private rather than governmental ownership and management.
6. The land remains productive.
7. There is less pressure on the farmer to sell since realty taxes
will no longer reflect the value of potential development.
Whyte's program has prompted several state legislatures to enact
enabling legislation: New York,3 4 Maryland, 35 Massachusetts,3 6 Connecticut,3" California 8 and New Jersey.39 Nevertheless, serious criticisms have been raised, not only as to the efficacy of this approach, but
also to its desirability. It is clearly not workable in areas where development is imminent, as Whyte himself admits.4 ° Furthermore, except for
2 and New York, 3
a few states such as New Jersey, 4 West Virgini
local governments are not enabled by statute to condemn such easements. Without such power an effective program cannot be imple32. Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 5, at 182-83.
33. WH TE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASE-

MENTS (Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin 36) (1959) ; WHYTE, op. cit. supra
note 24.
34. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247 (1960).
35. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66(c) § 357(A) (1960).
36. IBMASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40 § 8(C) (1961).
37. 7 CONN.GEN. STATS'. ANN. § 131(c) (1963) (Supp. 1964).

38. CALIF. GOVT. CODE ch. 12 § 6950 (1959) ; Note, Preservation of Open Spaces
Through Scenic Easemcnts and Greenbelt Zoning, 12 STAN. L. REv. 638 (1960).
39. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8A-6 (1961).
40. WHYTE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 17.
41. N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 13:8A-6 (1961).

42. W. VA. CODE OF 1961 ANN. ch. 20 § 2215.
43. N.Y.CONSERVATION LAW § 1-0707 (C. 174

L. 1964).
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niented." There is some authority, however, to the effect that the
power to condemn land necessarily includes the power to condemn less
than the fee.45 There is no doubt that condemnation for scenic purposes
is for a proper public use.46 But before the power of eminent domain
is exercised it should be certain that adequate safeguards are established
to protect landowners whose development rights are condemned:
1. Surrounding tracts must be similarly restricted so that the
development value of the tract which is restricted is not merely
shifted to other unrestricted tracts.
2. The surrounding land must be limited in such a manner that
uses which are allowed on the unrestricted tracts will be compatible with the uses permitted on the restricted land farming remains economically and socially feasible on the
restricted land.47
3. The rights and limitations on the owner's use of his restricted
land must be clearly specified.
Williams suggests that the typical enabling act is deficient, if not
fatally vague, in this third respect. In his opinion, "a policy of taking
conservation easements under the characteristic general statute is undesirable, potentially unfair, and legally dangerous. ' 4 This caveat was
49
well illustrated by the case of Pontiac Co. v. Board of Commissioners,
which he cites in support of his thesis. In that case the park commissioners sought to condemn certain easements (plantings, building types,
billboards, etc.) under an Ohio statute which authorized the acquisition
of "the fee or any lesser interest." The property owners successfully
enjoined the attempt, inter alia, because of a lack of a clear statement
of the exact interests to be taken:
[W]hen an interest less than the fee is sought to be acquired
the owner whose property is to be taken against his will should be
appraised of the exact extent of the lesser interest, so that he may
know definitely the extent of the interest which is not taken from
him. And the lesser interest taken must be described with such
certainty as to enable a jury to intelligently assess the compensa44. Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 5, at 192.
45. SIEGEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 29 n.314. But cf. Pontiac Co. v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 104 Ohio 447, 135 N.E. 640 (1922).
46. Rindge v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707-708, 43 S.Ct. 689,
693 (1923).
47. Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensable Regulations for Open Space, 29 JOURNAL
OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE Olt PLANNERS 87, 91 n. 9 (1963).
48. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 48.
49. 104 Ohio 447, 135 N.E. 640 (1922) (alternative holding). A covenant that
"no act or thing shall be done or placed or permitted to remain upon [land of covenantors] which shall injure, prejudice, affect or destroy the natural aspect and condition of the land" was held void for uncertainty. National Trust v. Mialands
Electricity Board, [1952] 1 Ch. 380.
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tion to be paid for the interest taken in accordance with the
Constitution."
But even where these legal obstacles have been surmounted, the
use of scenic easements, where they would be thought to be most effective, has not been altogether satisfactory. The National Park Service
has had substantial experience with scenic easements covering some
7,500 acres acquired along several parkways in Virginia, Tennessee
and other Southern states." While there has been scant litigation, the
Service has experienced considerable difficulty in enforcing the restrictions. The courts are reluctant to issue injunctions prior to the actual
violation of the restrictions, and damages are not only difficult to
ascertain but are insufficient relief (as where trees are cut). There
have been frequent misunderstandings between the government and
landowners as to the meaning of the restrictions, and even as to the
existence of the easement where the restricted land was purchased
without actual notice. As a result, many property owners have been
willing to exchange a portion of their land in fee for the extinguishment
of the scenic easement on the remainder. 52 The Service, faced with such
difficulties, has discontinued the acquisition of scenic easements.53
The federal experience presents a most instructive lesson concerning the feasible limitations of the scenic easement approach. The
easements, according to Williams, were most successful where they
protected against serious dangers where the land was not subject to
strong development pressures and where its normal use was not
greatly affected, and finally, where the easements were affirmative,
rather than negative, in character. Easements were generally inadequate where there was considerable interference with existing land use
5 4
or where the land was subject to real estate speculation pressure.
These limitations are well worth serious consideration. They
suggest the necessity for careful drafting of the easement agreement
and the need to employ several techniques, not only initially, but as the
land development pressure begins to grow. The difficulties in enforcement do not necessarily suggest that easements are inadequate per se,
50. 104 Ohio 447, 464, 135 N.E. 640, 645 (1922).
51. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 44 n.42.

52. Id. at 45.
53. H.R. RUP. No. 273, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) : "On the basis of 20 years
of experience, such easements breed misunderstandings, cause administrative difficulties,

are difficult to enforce, and cost only a little less than the fee." "Whyte challenges the
cost criticism"; OPSN SPAcz AcTIoN, supra note 24, at 18. However, Lower Gynedd
Township in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, rejected the development rights
approach as too costly: COMPRXHSNSIVZ PLAN FOR LoWzR GYNDD TowNsHIP (Montgomery County Planning Commission, Norristown, Pa.) 129 (Jan. 1961).
54. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 46.
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but at a particular state of the area's development, they may no longer
be sufficient, and that the land should then either be purchased to
preserve its open state or be developed.
C.

The Legal Intricacies of Scenic Easements

An examination of the easement approach is not complete without highlighting a number of common law technicalities which may

jeopardize the community's open land preservation program unless
particular attention is given to the drafting of the easement agreements.
It may even be necessary that the state's open space enabling legislation
be drafted to abrogate some of these rules. In any event, it seems inadvisable, in the absence of such legislation, to consider scenic or conservation restrictions as "easements" and to seek to bring them within the
traditional and rather inflexible category of common law rights.
The first limitation on the use of legal easements as devices for
land use control is the proposition that the law will not recognize new
kinds of easements. 5 While this view is not always adhered to, it does
represent a reluctance to create additional encumbrances on land.56
The doctrine is most frequently applied in the case of negative easements, where the owner of the land subject to the easement (burdened
land) must refrain from certain otherwise lawful uses of his land.
Negative easements are said to be limited to the four categories of light,
air, support and flow of artificial streams.57 Scenic easements would be
generally negative in nature (prohibiting erection of buildings, removal

of trees, etc.).
55. Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 535, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834)
is often cited for this view: "It must not . . . be supposed that incidents of a novel
kind can be devised and attached to property, at the fancy or caprice of any owner.
It is clearly inconvenient both to the science of the law and the public weal, that such
latitude be given." But compare the statement in Dyce v. Hay, 1 Macq. 305, 312
(H.L. 1852): "The category of servitudes and easements must alter and expand with
the changes that take place in the circumstances of mankind." An example of the
Keppell view is the refusal of English courts to recognize easements of prospect on
the ground that such servitudes would prevent the development of cities. Fratcher
concludes that this refusal to enforce legal easements having purely aesthetic value
has destroyed the utility of legal servitudes as devices to impose the types of restrictions most needed for city planning. Fratcher, Legal Servitudes as devices for Imposing Use Restrictions in Michigan, 2 WAYNx L. Rev. 1 (1955). However, the following
easement was upheld in In re EllenboroughPark, [1955] 1 Ch. 131 : "the full enjoyment
at all times hereafter of the (Park] . . . subject to the payment of a fair and just
proportion of the costs, charges and expenses, of keeping in good order and condition
the same pleasure ground." This case is analyzed and the doctrine of jus spatiandi is
discussed in 221 L.T. 34 (1956). See also Rights Capable of Existing as Easements,
186 L.T. 459 (1938); Conrad, Easement Novelties, 30 CALIF. L. Rev. 125 (1942).
56. It should also be noted that with the exception of a few "spurious" easements,
the common law was unwilling to recognize easements which imposed affirmative
duties upon the servient tenement which would run to subsequent owners. Reno, infra
note 57, at 958-60, 970; The modern American view seems contrary, note 134 infra.
57. Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L. Rev. 951,
959 (1942) ; GALE, EAStMtNTS, 30 (Bowles ed. 1959).
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A second difficulty is posed by the traditional English notion that
the easement is created for the benefit of the land of the holder of the
easement, and, therefore, is said to be appurtenant to that land. The
benefited land was designated the dominant tenement, or under Roman
law, the master estate; the burdened land was referred to as the servient
tenement or slave estate." Therefore, unlike profits a prendre, 59 easements which were in gross (beneficial to the owner of the easement
irrespective of the existence of a dominant tenement) were not recognized in England,6 ° or at least the burden would not run to subsequent
owners of the burdened land."' In the case of scenic easements it is
unlikely that the public authority to which the easements are granted
would possess a dominant tenement to which the benefit would be
62
considered appurtenant.
3
While most American courts recognize easements in gross,
the benefit of the easement, as in England,

4

is generally unassignable

5

58. Reno, supra note 57, at 954.
59. A profit A prendre is another category of incorporeal hereditament, or legal
servitude, but is a right to remove a corporeal portion of the servient tenement, such as
timber, fish and turf. It is different than an easement which is a right without profit,
although both are treated as easements by the Restatement of Property. RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (Servitudes) Vol. V, 450, Special Note (1944). See criticisms of the
Restatement approach in CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE
LAND, 8 n.23 (2d ed. 1947).

60. King v. Allen & Sons, 2 A.C. 54 (1916), same case below, 2 Ir. R. 448 (1915);
GALE, op. cit. supra
note 57, at 7.
61. Hill v. Tupper, 2 Hurl & Colt 120, 159 Eng. Rep. 51 (Ex. 1863) ; CLARK,
op. cit. supra note 59, at 68; Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangcrs
to a Contract, 18 COL. L. RUv. 291, 312 (1918).
62. In a brief footnote, William Whyte, Jr., the chief proponent of conservation
easements, submits (without citing authority) that "a park commission which purchases a scenic easement would be the 'dominant tenement'." However, this may not
be the view of some courts unless the deed restrictions clearly indicate the particular
land owned by the commission to which the easement is intended to be appurtenant.
It is not enough that the commission owns some land; there must be aT sufficient
nexus between the servient and dominant tenements. Even in the case of scenic easements along highways, the court might not deem that a local park commission
possesses a dominant tenement in a state highway: Compare United States v. 64.88
Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 29 (W.D. Pa. 1956), rev'd, 244 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1957).
It may be necessary that the rule of London County Council v. Allen be abrogated
by statute as in Wisconsin, or that some portion of the land be deeded in fee to the
commission: See Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. Town of Newton, 183 N.E. 2d 118
(Mass. 1962). It is sufficient to say that in the view of this writer, Mr. Whyte's casual
reference may be misleading. See text and eases cited at notes 128-132 infra, and
WHYTE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 11 n.1 (1959).
63. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 59, at 69. But cf. United States v. 64.88 Acres of
Land, 144 F. Supp. 29, 37 (W.D. Pa. 1956), rev'd, 244 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1957);
WARREN'S WEED, Nrw YORK REAL PROPERTY, 722 (4th ed. 1955). See cases cited at
Rangely v. Midland Ry. Co., L.R. 3 Eq. 306, 310 (1868);

note 127, infra.

64. Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 C.B. 164 (1850).
65. 2 AMERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY §§ 8.78-8.83 (Casner ed. 1952); CLARK, op.
cit. supra note 58, at 67; Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt, 227 N.Y. 429, 433,
125 N.E. 834, 838 (1920) ; Morgan v. McLaughlin, 6 Misc. 2d 434, 163 N.Y.S.2d 51,
55 (1957), aff'd on other grounds, sub. nom. Morgan v. City of Glen Cove, 6 A.D. 2d
704, 174 N.Y.S.2d 890, aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 1041, 158 N.E.2d 498 (1959). For other New
York cases see Note, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 676 (1962) (commercial easements in gross)
WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 51-52.
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Where it has been held assignable it was of a commercial or economic
nature. 0 A corollary of the rule of unassignability is the doctrine that
easements appurtenant may not be severed from the dominant tenement.67 An attempt to transfer or sever an appurtenant easement and
create an easement in gross might well extinguish the easement.""
Thus, even if the public authority was deemed to possess a dominant
tenement, it would be unable to transfer the easement, as it might wish
to do if it were necessary to vest control in a different public agency.
A final problem arises where there is unity in the ownership of
the fee and the easement. In such a situation the easement will be
extinguished"9 as, for example, where the public authority acquires
the servient tenement. The easement then would be ineffective against
a subsequent purchaser without express stipulation.7"
If the scenic restriction is not a common law easement, it is likely
to be considered either a real covenant or an equitable servitude. The
problems which are inherent in these classifications will be examined
71
in connection with the discussion of private restrictive covenants, infra.
D.

Compensable Regulations

Occupying an intermediate position between compensatory government acquisition (eminent domain and purchase and non-compensable
regulation utilization of the policy power) is the "compensable regulation" originated by Professors Krasnowiecki and Paul in a study
sponsored by Penjerdel, Inc., a regional planning association for
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware. They propose controls on
development similar to zoning, but with a government guarantee that
66. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 489-492. For criticisms of this dichotomy see
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 59, at 79-83. Judge Clark has asserted that the English
view of unassignability of easements in gross, as opposed to profits in gross, is
basically a sound result of balancing the utility of the easement with the disadvantages
of unmarketable titles. He argued that easements in gross are often of little value,
easily forgotten, and if the holder of the easement in gross sells his land, remarries
and dies, it would be difficult to locate the present owner. This would create serious
clogs on titles to the burdened lands, thereby impeding their free alienability. CLARK,
op. cit. supra note 58, at 72-74.

67. Cadwalader v. Bailey, 71 R.I. 495, 23 Atd. 20 (1891); AMERICAN LAW
cit. supra note 65, at § 8.73; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 58, at 89.

PROPERTY, op.

OF

68. Cadwalader v. Bailey, supra note 67.
69. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 65, at §§ 8.88, 8.93; FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES Op REAL PROPERTY, 221, 286 (2d ed. 1963).
70. There is also some authority that a tax foreclosure will extinguish the

easements.

AMERICAN

LAW OP PROPERTY, op.

cit. supra

note

65, at

§§ 8.103-104;

FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 69, at 222-24, 286; Contra, O'Malley v. Comm. of Public
Works of Boston, 340 Mass. 542, 165 N.E. 2d 113 (1960). See discussion of majority
and minority rules in Note, 41 GEo. L.J. 525 (1953). Furthermore, the easement may
terminate when the purpose for which it was created no longer exists: Compare
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra 65, at 298 n.lb (Supp. 1962) ; FRIEDMAN,
op. cit. supra note 69, at 222 n.8. But see, Restrictions voluntarily imposed on the

use of land, New York Law Revision Commission, 249, 256-57 (1958).
71. Infra, notes 108 to 137.
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the owner will receive, at the time of sale, an amount equal to the fair
market value of the property determined at a time prior to the imposition of the controls. 7 2 The owner is paid nothing to compensate for
the restrictions until he sells his property, and then only an amount
equal to the difference between the sale price (at a review board
supervised public auction) and the earlier assessed value. Appropriate
adjustments are made for inflation.
Such a scheme is, by necessity, more complex than easement
acquisition or fee condemnation, and would require more administrative machinery. The enforcement problems of development rights
(scenic easements) exist here as well. It is difficult to predict the cost
of such a program. Initially one might suspect it would cost little.
However, it would seem that property owners subject to existing,
non-compensatory regulation would seek to come under this program.
As Miss Siegel said in relation to scenic easements, "one may wonder
why, insofar as the community may legally restrict land use through
the regulatory processes of zoning, serious thought is given to a
proposal to buy such restrictions. 178 Others may object to widespread
public ownership of development rights and the concurrent denial of
the "farmer's" right to the speculation worth of his property. While
in theory "just compensation" in condemnation proceedings need not
reflect the loss of the chance to realize potential increment in value,
it is questionable whether that solution would be quite so perfect as
it might first appear. There is a danger that such rights will be overcondemned since vast areas of land may be "regulated" at no initial
cost to the government and little actual public inquiry, despite provision
for notification to owners of the proposed regulations. A farmer
notified that his farm will be restricted to farming may not be too
aroused if the pressures of development have not yet reached his area.
There would be little opportunity for the ordinary layman-landowner,
in actual practice, to adequately insure himself a fair guarantee. He
clearly will be less aware of the consequences to the assessed worth of
his property, at the time of assessment, than if his fee were condemned.
When he later comes to collect his guarantee and contest the assessed
worth, he will have a difficult burden showing that the assessment was
unreasonable. Who can testify that his land was more valuable twenty
years ago? In any event, the negation of potential value in property
on such a vast scale can be expected to raise the hackles of many
conservatives. Yet, liberals have criticized this proposal as too reactionary to meet the pressing needs for open space and as "tainted"
72. Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 5; Krasnowiecki & Strong, supra note 47.
73. SIMGEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 30-31.
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by the "all too prevalent view that that government is best which spends
' 74
least and slowest."
Finally, compensable regulations, good or bad, are subject to the
same pressures of development as zoning. Nevertheless, this proposal
should be commended for its attempt to combine the use of the condemnation and police powers and to resolve their court-made dichotomy."
II. GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Various non-compensatory regulatory techniques have been employed to freeze existing uses of property to preserve open space. On
the state level, only a few non-compensatory programs have been
attempted. 7 Recently, Hawaii passed an extremely encompassing zoning act which classified land as urban, conservation or agriculture. Its
provisions have been subject to major revision because of its impact
and scope. 77 Clearly Hawaii in size alone presents a unique situation.
But on the local level more extensive use of the police power is evident.
Some use has been made of the official map. New Jersey prohibits
development within an area mapped as a park or playground; this is
limited, however, to a one year period from the application for plat
approval.78 The official map technique is limited by the requirement
that the owner be allowed to develop if he can show that his property
cannot yield a reasonable rate of return as restricted.7 9 However, the
official map has been frequently overrated by city planners for they
often assume that by coloring a person's land green on a map, he will
cheerfully sell to the city at its price. s
Various forms of zoning are being widely used by communities,
including flood plain,"1 wetlands, historic, 82 scenic," agriculture 4 and
74. Lipman (State Office of Planning, Sacramento, Calif.), Comments, 29 JOURNAL

87, 98.
75. Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 5, at 190-91.

OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE oF PLANNERS

76. E.g., Wis. STATS. ANN. § 59.07(49)

(1959)

(billboard control) and cases

collected in Spillman, ARCHITECTURAL CONTROLS BASED ON AESTHETIC CONSIDERATIONS

(University of Pennsylvania Law School Land Use Seminar, unpublished paper) 10
(Jan. 1964).
77. REVISED LAWS or HAWAII (1955) § 98H-I (Supp. 1963).
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1:20 (Supp. 1962). See also ARK. STATS. ANN.
§ 19-2829 (1957).
79. Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936); State
ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957) ; Miller v. City of
Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
80. E.g., STRONG (Senior Planner, N.Y.C. Planning Comm.) LOCAL PLANNING
ADMINISTRATION 284 (McLean ed. 1959) :"Most people are not interested in constructing a dwelling on a piece of land that the city will be acquiring even some time in
the future. They are not interested in moving into a house only to have to move out

later, and are therefore usually only too glad to sell."
81. Dunham, Flood Control via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1098 (1959)
CONN. GEN. STATS. (Rev. 1959) § 25-3(c) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1-26.
82. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B §§ 38-50 (1959).

83. Cf., Raimondo v. Bd. of Appeals, 331 Mass. 228, 118 N.E.2d 67 (1954).
84. OTT, THE NEED, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LIMITATION OF AGRICULTURAL ZONING
(Fresno, Calif.) (June 1957) ; Wershaw, Agricultural Zoning in Florida, 13 U. FLA.
L. REv. 479 (1960).
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recreation or so-called "0" (open) zones.8 5 Until recently, the most
accepted regulatory device has been the low-density, high acre zoning.
It has been employed both as a means to preserve open space and to
time the community's development. Like all methods of zoning it has
two serious drawbacks: (a) it may be struck down as confiscatory
and (b) it may not withstand the pressures of development. Yet,
courts have sustained minimum lot requirements ranging from 5,000
square feet to five acres."6 When zoning is used for the express purpose of timing development, it has often been struck down."
Recently, planners have begun to doubt the efficacy of minimum
acre zoning as a solution to the open space problem:
While Lower Gynedd's two acre zoning will, if permanent, insure
relatively low density development and large lot sizes, it will not
preserve the present rural character of the Township. . . .Two
acre 'suburban estates' attractive as they may be, will replace
many of the natural amenities and destroy the rural character
of the Township.8 8
In a recent study the Urban Land Institute estimated that it
would take lot sizes of five to ten acres to accomplish these open
space objectives.'
Some planners have rejected the minimum acre
85. Compare McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P. 2d
932 (1953), cert. den., 348 U.S. 817, 75 U.S. 29 (1954) (exclusive recreation
district upheld) with Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493,
121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) (exclusive zone for parking lot use invalid taking) ; Quintini v.
City of Bay St. Louis, 64 Miss. 483, 1 So. 625 (1886) ;King v. Incorp. Village of Ocean
Beach, 207 Misc. 100, 136 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; 11 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS 320-22 (3d ed. 1950).
86. Senior v. Zoning Comm'n of New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959),
cert. den., 363 U.S. 143, 80 S.Ct. 1083 (4 acres) ; Fischer v. Bedminster T.wp., 21 N.J.
Super. 81, 90 A.2d 757 (1952), aff'd, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) (5 acres);
Spillman, supra note 76, at 33; but see, DuPage v. Halkier, 1 111. 2d 491, 115 N.E.2d
635 (1953). See Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth
on the Urban Fringe, Wis. L. Rgv. 370, 381 (1961). He suggests that courts will be
less willing to sanction large lot zoning in the future.
87. Compare Board of Supervisors v. Carpenter, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390
(1959) ; Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962)
(zoning cannot be used to control population and maintain or improve property value
or aesthetics) and Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 17 (1960)
("floating zones") with Josephs v. Clarkstown, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960)
and Ward v. Montgomery Twp., 28 N.J. 529, 147 A.2d 248 (1958) ; Gruber v. Mayor
of Raritan, 68 N.J. Super. 118, 172 A.2d 47, 52 (L. 1961); but see, Opgal, Inc. v.
Burns, 20 Misc. 2d 803, 189 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aft'd, 10 App. Div. 2d 977,
201 N.Y.S.2d 831, aff'd, iner., 9 N.Y.2d 659, 173 N.E.2d 50 (1961) ; Krasnowiecki &
Paul, supra note 5, at 188-89; Cutler, Legal and Illegal Means for Controlling
Community Growth on the Urban Fringe, Wis. L. Rxv. 370 (1961).
88. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR LOWtiR GYNEDD TOWNSHIP (Montgomery County

Planning Commission, Norristown, Pa.) 122 (Jan. 1961).
89. The Effects of Large Lot Zoning on Residential Development, 32 U.L.I. TXcH.
BULL. 10 (1958) : "Nor should large lot zoning be expected to guarantee the preservation of open space except when so extreme as to totally discourage development. It
may merely deconcentrate residential populations, tending to distribute development
farther out into the metropolitan periphery. When employed in a wide scale . . .this
practice suggests serious long range implications concerning extension of communi-
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approach as undesirable, regardless of the size lots required, on even
broader grounds:
The acre lot is not a solution to open space. Yet, zoning and
planning, by and large, have frozen the pattern of neighborhood
development to the large lot with its relatively high cost of facilities
per housing unit. In industrial and payroll areas where incomes
are limited, we find the yardspaces cramped, poorly utilized and
all too often overgrown with weeds and strewn with rubbage....
The attempt to obtain open space through large lot or acreage
zoning has been shown to be illusory. Not only has it intensified
rather than minimized the evils of urban sprawl, but it has entailed
the corresponding evils of inefficiency and costliness of utilities,
services, schools; and has wasted land without producing open
space in the true meaning of the term. Public authorities which
continue to recommend this way of controlling population density
are kidding themselves as to its economy, desirability, or ultimate
assurance of a solution to open-type development."
III.

A.

PRIVATE TECHNIQUES

Donation of Open Space

At a time when New Jersey is willing to spend $60 million for its
Green Acres program; Wisconsin $50 million; Pennsylvania $70
million and New York $100 million, it seems strange that state and
local governments have frequently overlooked the potential value of
acquiring rights in land through conditioned and unconditioned gifts,
devises and voluntary restrictive agreements. The Regional Plan Study
of New York-New Jersey-Connecticut found that about 25-30% of the
total land acquired by states for parks (1942-1956) was obtained
through gifts."' Large estates have been donated to local public authorities and to private conservation associations. One appealing variant
is the gift of the fee simple with the retention of a term for years or
a life estate by the donor.9 2 Some attempts have been made to encourage
such donations through real estate tax concessions. Unfortunately,
cation and service lines and the ultimate size of urbanized area. If what is needed is

extensive and permanently preserved open space to serve as breaks in the cityscape,
to give identity and individuality to peripheral communities, and also to set aside
areas of natural scenic beauty for the enjoyment and use of metropolitan populations,
large lot zoning will of itself not satisfy these objectives." But see WHIPAIN
TOWNSHIP - COMPRXH9NSlVZ PLAN (Montgomery County Planning Comm., Pa.)
(Oct. 1961): After noting that their two acre requirement is insufficient, in response
to the ULI report, it concluded that it might "be forced to consider [its] present
policies in terms of even larger lot sizes. It is interesting to note that New Jersey,
California and Connecticut are among the States who have adopted a large lot policy."
90. California Conference, supra note 5, at 74.
91. The Race for Open Space, 96 R.P.A. BULL. 53 (1960) ; SUMGL, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 7 n.82.
92. See, e.g., N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW §§ 1.0713, 1.0714 (10 years).
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difficult constitutional as well as statutory problems are apt to arise
in many states. For example, in Whipple v. Teaneck Township 3 the
court held that the municipality could not exempt land from taxation
which had been donated to the township for park purposes with the
reservation of a life estate. 4 Yet, where development rights and the
like are donated, it would seem that the assessor should be limited to
the value of the land as restricted. 5
B.

Private Restrictive Covenants

There has been surprisingly little discussion of the role of private
preservation of open space and scenic attraction through the use of
mutual restrictive covenants. The failure to employ such techniques
may reflect in part the legal intricacies of real covenants and equitable
servitudes. It also may indicate that some specialized organization is
needed to encourage owners to enter into such schemes and to provide
legal and technical assistance to them.96 While the imposition of building restrictions in new subdivisions is not uncommon, there have been
few government attempts to suggest the types of restrictions which
would be best for the community, and even less encouragement of
restrictions in established neighborhoods.9 7
One of the best known and most successful schemes is the "Mill
Creek Valley Agreement" of Lower Merion Township. (Pennsylvania)
which was originated in 1941.8 Through mutual deed restriction the
owners are prohibited, with certain exceptions, from erecting buildings,
walls and fences within the restricted area, and from destroying trees
and other natural cover without the approval of the township's planning
or shade tree commissions. The township made preliminary surveys
and provided legal assistance in framing the agreements.
The most extensive and imaginative utilization of this technique
is now being employed in the beautiful Lake George region of New
York's Adirondack Mountains. Prompted by the alarming spread of
honkytonks and garish motels, L. Judson Morehouse, New York
Republican State Chairman, initiated preventive legislation9" which
93. 135 N.J.L. 345, 52 A.2d 44 (1947).
94. Accord, N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW § 1.0713.
95. See NEw YORK GEN. MUN. LAW § 247(3) (1960).
96. See generally the discussion in Ascher, Private Covenants in Urban Redevelop,,ent, in URBAN REDEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES, 223 (Woodbury ed.
1953) ; Zile, Private Restrictions on Residential Subdivisions, 32 WiS. BAR BULL. 27
(April 1959).
97. One of the leading cases which upheld restrictions between landowners not
deriving title from a common grantor is Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch,
70 N.Y. 440 (1877).
98. The Preservation of Stream Valleys, INFORMATION BULLETIN #1 (Bucks

County Park Board, Doylestown, Pa.) (March 1957).
99. See address to Lake George Chamber of Commerce, supra note 1.
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created the Lake George Park Commission in 1961." ° ' Until that time,
most of the area was not protected from commercial encroachment by
zoning regulations.1 ' Within the Park area the Commission is empowered to: . . .
2. Adopt, sponsor, and encourage the use of forms of deeds, agreements, covenants, and other legal documents by means of
which owners of real property within the Lake George Park
may voluntarily prohibit, restrict, and control the use thereof
for commercial purposes.
3. Encourage owners of real property ... by written instrument
to prohibit, restrict or control voluntarily the use of such real
property for commercial purposes.
4. Acquire interests or rights in real property . . . for the purpose of prohibiting, restricting, or controlling the use of such
real property for commercial purposes.
5. Establish rules, regulations, and procedures by which the Commission may authorize or permit a necessary or desirable use
of land or prevent unnecessary hardship in an individual or
particular instance by altering or modifying in whole or in
part any restriction contained in any conveyance to or agreement with the Commission or which the Commission has
power to alter or modify.
6. Encourage . . . and assist municipalities . . . in preparation
and adoption of zoning laws or ordinances and other local
legislation to restrict or control commercial uses....
17. Establish advisory committees and enlist and accept the support and cooperation of organizations of property owners or
in promoting the purposes and objectives of
others interested
10 2
this part.
In addition, the use of certain signs and advertising devices are
restricted in the Park' and various objectionable uses of land, such
as junk yards, circuses, dance halls and trailer camps' 0 4 are prohibited
without a permit issued after public hearing.
The Commission is not empowered to zone any area unless all
owners within the proposed zone agree thereto and execute agreements
with the Commission, 10 5 hence its appellation, "do-it-yourself-zoning."
It is clear that a "non-signed" cannot be bound by this type of
100. N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW C. 454 L. 1961, §§ 840-46 (as amended by c. 794
L. 1964, c. 475 L. 1964).
101. Letter from Laura L. Manning, Town Clerk, Town of Fort Ann (July
31, 1963).
102. N.Y. CONStRVAtION LAW § 843.

103. Id. at § 847.
104. Application denied for trailer camp permit by Town Board of Lake George:

letter from E. J. Monroe, Chairman, LGPC (September 30, 1963).
105. Press Release, May 14, 1963. See N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW § 849(a).
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"zoning." 10 6 At last report three permanent resident zones and six
proposed zones have been established; preliminary work is underway
to create eight additional zones.'0 7
It is too early to assess the success of this plan, and no court
cases have arisen to test the validity of the restrictions. Nevertheless,
this plan merits the attention of all lawyers and planners who seek to
utilize private cooperation in solving the problems of preserving attractive scenic areas.
The success of this program as well as other schemes which seek
to employ such restrictions depends upon the extent to which the agreements reflect an awareness of the many intricacies which are inherent
in the law of legal covenants and equitable servitudes. It is, therefore,
advisable to examine the nature of these restrictions to determine what
legal and equitable limitations might diminish their effectiveness. It is
worthwhile to reconsider the scenic "easement" at this point as well.
A real covenant or covenant running with the land is another
category of incorporeal interest which was developed concurrently with
the growth of the law of profits A. prendre and easements.' s The
requisites for creating a covenant which would run with the land were
very stringent,' 09 and the most difficult was frequently the requirement
of privity of estate. Unless there was a complete assignment of the
covenantor's estate, the burden of the covenant would not run to subsequent possessors of the land since the necessary privity of estate
with the covenantee or his assigns would be absent."' Furthermore,
unlike profits and easements, the real covenant was considered a contractual obligation which created in the covenantee rights in personam
against the covenantor and his assigns but not rights in rem against
the general public."' Thus, the only type of relief that a court of
law would grant for breach of covenant was a judgment for money
damages." 2 Finally, the English courts refused to extend the rule of
covenants running with the land beyond cases of covenants in leases
between landlord and tenant, and, therefore, the running of the burden
of covenants between owners in fee was not recognized." 3 This view
4
still prevails in England and a few American states."
106. Eveleth v. Best, 322 Mich. 637, 37 N.W.2d 504 (1948).

107. The Schenectady Gazette, August 30, 1963.

108. Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L. REv. 951,
961 (1942). See discussion of legal easements in text at notes 55-70 supra.
109. The requirements were laid down in the famous Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16a,
77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B. 1583).
110. Reno, supra note 108, at 964.
111. Id. at 965; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 362-63 (Casner ed. 1952).
112. AMERICAN LAW O1VPROPERTY, Ibid.
113. Austerberry v. Oldham Corp., 29 Ch. D. 750 (C.A.. 1885); AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY, Id. at 382.
114. AMERICAN LAW Or PROPERTY, Ibid.; Reno, supra note 108, at 967; CI.ARK,
COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUxNIN
WITH THE LAND 132-33 (2d ed. 1947).
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It is apparent from these serious limitations that real covenants
were totally inadequate as devices for land use control in an increasingly urbanized society." 5 But, while the English courts of law were
frustrating attempts to expand the function of real covenants, equity
was developing new devices more suitable to deal with the growth
of cities."" Tulk v. Moxhay,- 7 the Enklish case that originated the
doctrine of equitable servitudes, held that an agreement to use land in
a particular manner will be enforced against purchasers of the land with
notice, whether or not the agreement satisfied the requirements of a
legal covenant. The rationale of the decision is somewhat unclear. As
a result two different theories of enforcement of such agreements have
emerged; first, that the restrictions are specifically enforceable as a
contract concerning land, and second, that the agreement creates an
equitable property interest in the burdened land, similar to easements
and profits." 8 This latter theory seems to be supported by English
courts, most learned writers and a majority of American cases."'
Thus, according to the majority view the owner of the benefited land
is entitled to injunctive relief without being required to show damage.'
The easement analogy has, however, created considerable difficulty
in certain respects which are germane to the problem of scenic "easements." It was previously pointed out that the English courts had
refused to recognize legal easements in gross, and, since equitable servitudes were considered analogous to legal easements, the courts refused
to enforce equitable easements in gross against subsequent purchasers.
The leading case is London County Council v. Allen' in which the
covenantor promised the Council not to construct buildings on a portion of his land in return for permission to lay out a road. The Council
sought to restrain covenantor's successor (with notice)122 from violat115. Reno, supra note 108, at 970. The use of rights of entry and possibilities of
reverter as devices to restrict land use are not discussed in this article. See the references cited in Fratcher, Legal Servitudes as Devices for Imposing Use Restrictions in
Michigan, 2 WAYNE L. Rgv. 1, 11 n.66 (Part I) (1955).
116. Reno, supra note 108, at 970-79 and Part II, 1067-1101. Fratcher suggests
that equitable servitudes are more suitable than legal servitudes since the latter are
too rigid for changing urban conditions. Fratcher, supra note 115, at 11-12.
117. 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
118. Reno, supra note 108, at 973; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 114, at 170;
AMERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 111, at 403.
119. London County Council v. Allen, [1914] 3 K.B. 642; CLARK, op. cit. supra
note 114, at 174; AMERICAN LAw op PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 111, at 403. Reno,
thoroughly discusses the significance of these two theories; See also the able discussion
in Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18 CoLuMn.
L. REv. 291, 295 (1918).
120. 2 AMERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY 404 (Casner ed. 1952).

121. [1914] 3 K.B. 642.
122. A subsequent purchaser of the burdened land who takes without notice is not
bound by equitable servitudes, but presumably constructive notice provided by recording would negate this defense: AMERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 120,
at 404.
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579

ing the agreement, but the Court of Appeals refused to extend the
doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay to a situation where the covenantee
(Council) did not possess a dominant tenement. 123 Unfortunately, the
24
English view has been followed by a majority of American cases.1
There are some cases to the contrary,'2 5 and in at least one jurisdiction,
the rule has been abrogated by statute.2 6 The American result is somewhat illogical since a majority of jurisdictions have recognized that
legal easements in gross run against subsequent owners of the servient
land, though holding the easement to be unassignable.127 This hostility
toward interests in gross may be fatal to many current scenic easement schemes since the courts may find that the public authority
28
possesses no dominant tenement.

A further difficulty (perhaps based on the easement analogy) is
posed by the English rule that agreements which impose affirmative
obligations on the burdened land will not be enforced against subsequent takers with notice.' 29 Under this view it would seem that some
desirable requirements of a scenic restriction agreement which were
affirmative in nature (removal of dead trees, roadside brush, etc.)
would be unenforceable against purchasers with notice.'3 0 The English
3
rule, however, is not followed by most American cases.' '
Several other obstacles to the use of equitable restrictions should
be considered by local open space planners. One is the generally
accepted doctrine that if the covenantee (subdivision developer) reserves
a power to release or modify the restrictions on some lots, the covenantors (lot owners) will be unable to enforce the restrictions inter
123. 13 MicH. L. Rzv. 150 (1914). See discussion in Reno, supra note 108, at
1087-90; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 114, at 181-83.
124. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 9.32, op. cit. supra note 120; Reno, supra
note 108, at 1088 n.163; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 114, at 181 n.48. Cf. United States
v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 29, 37 (W.D. Pa. 1956), rev'd, 244 F.2d 534
(3d Cir. 1957). See also Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 338 P.2d 522

(1959) ; Javna v. D. J. Fredericks, Inc., 41 N.J. Super. 353, 125 A.2d 227, 231 (1956)
(discussion of government restrictions) ; WARReN'S WEED, NEw YORK REAL PROPERTY,
722 (4th ed. 1955).
125. Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913) (leading case) ; Pratte
v. Bakatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955) ; Reno, supra note 108, at 1088 n. 165;
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 114, at 182 n.49.
126. Wis. STATS. ANN. § 236.293 (1957). See also the English Housing Act,
15 Geo. 5, ch. 14 § 110 (1925).
127. Reno, supra note 108, at 1089 n. 164; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 114, at
68 nn.16 & 17.
128. See discussion of William Whyte's view at note 62, supra. Compare Sylvania
Elec. Products, Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 1962) (Option on
parcel of land granted to city to allow it to have dominant tenement to enforce
restrictions).

129. Haygood v. Brunswick Building Society, 8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881).
130. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 111, at 438. Cf. Furness v.
Singuett, 60 N.J. Super. 410, 159 A.2d 455 (Ch. 1960).
131. Neposit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 278 N.Y.
248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (land assessment); CLARK, op. cit. supra note 114, at 179-80;
AMERICAN LAW OV PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 111, at 439 n.8.
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se.' 32 The existence of such a power is deemed to negate any intent to
create a uniform development, and therefore, the restrictions are
considered to be imposed solely for the developer's benefit. Furthermore, indiscriminate use of this power by the developer may well
cause the court to deny him injunctive relief.'8
Finally, some states prescribe a short period of limitations for
breach of restrictive covenants,' 3 or place a time limit on their duration.' 35 Equitable relief has also been denied where there has been a
6
substantial change in the character of the area.1
While these restrictions present serious limitations to the use of
equitable servitudes in the community's open land preservation program,
they are not insurmountable if the enabling legislation and the terms
of the agreements are carefully drawn."'
IV.

A.

BARGAINING WITH THE HOUSING DEVELOPER

Cluster Zoning

While the scenic easement may be an appropriate device to preserve
scenic views, agriculture, flood and "0" zoning sufficient to hold large
areas of rural land in their open state, once the community and the
subdivider consider a tract suitable for development, other planning
132. The cases within a single jurisdiction are often in apparent conflict. Compare

Ludlum v. Haskins, 177 Misc. 103, 28 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1941), modified on other grounds,
263 App. Div. 741, 31 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1941), aff'd without opinion, 291 N.Y. 811, 53
N.E.2d 574; Leitman v. City of Yonkers, 193 N.Y.S.2d 967, 969 (1959), aff'd, 10
A.D.2d 950, 201 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1960)
(government imposed deed restrictions);
Brighton by the Sea v. Rivkin, 201 App. Div. 726, 195 N.Y.S. 198 (1922) ; Mauro v.
Tomasullo, 28 Misc. 2d 666, 212 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; Kreppel v. Tucker,
220 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ; 225 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See Brueggen
v. Boehm, 344 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. 1961) ; Annot. 19 A.L.R.2d 1274, 1282 (1951). See
note 136, infra.
133. Cf. Brighton by the Sea v. Rivkin, supra note 132 and discussion in Sohns v.
Beavis, 200 N.Y. 268, 274, 93 N.E. 935, 937 (1911) ; Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra
note 5, at 194 n.57. See also the powers granted to the Lake George Park Commission to alter or modify the restrictions: N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW § 843(5). This
power may well prevent the covenantors from enforcing the restrictions inter se (see
note 131 supra). If this is the intention of the Commission, it should be clearly
indicated in the covenant agreements.
134. New York, REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS & PROCEEDINGS LAW § 1801 (c. 116
L. 1963).
135. FRIEDVIAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES oF REAL PROPERTY, 275-76 n.21
(2d ed. 1963) ; Restrictions Voluntarily Imposed on the Use of Land, supra note
70, at 275.
136. Id. at 271, 275 n.20; WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 52; AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 111, at § 9.39.
137. A further attraction to such schemes as proposed by the Lake George Park
Commission is the possibility that the Federal Internal Revenue Code permits a
charitable deduction for the grant of a perpetual easement to the Commission for the
fair market value of the restrictive easement with an adjustment in the basis of the
property. Rev. Rul. 64-205, INT. REV. BULL. 1964-30, 6 (§ 170(c) (1) deduction
allowed). But if the restrictions are enforceable inter se, there is a corresponding
benefit to the landowner which might negate a donative intent. Valuation, of course,
might be quite difficult. See also Mattie Fair, 27 T.C. 866 (1957). (Acq.) 1957-2
CUM. BULL. 4.
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tools will have to be employed to guarantee the most desirable employment of the open areas generated by the particular development.
Whether there has been a genuine recognition of the need for open space
by developers or simply buyer resistance to the "housing development"
with its mediocre sameness in design, the standard grid pattern has
given way to the more flexible "overall density-varying lot size" scheme.
The post-war building boom significantly reduced the importance of
custom building, and with the collapse of that boom, the mass builder
has been forced to build more imagination into his subdivision plan. 138
The trend toward better land use has been greatly aided by the joint
efforts of the Urban Land Institute and the National Association of
Home Builders. The result of their efforts is the "cluster development.' 1 3 ' The cluster pattern of development has been enthusiastically
received by many planning authorities. The Lower Gynedd Comprehensive Plan espoused this pattern because it:
allows the developer to 'break away' from the restrictions which
have frequently resulted in monotonous subdivision developments.
Uniform lot sizes rigidly oriented to street frontages have been
the result of many zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations.
This recently conceived pattern of development is predicated on an
'overall density-varying lot size' requirement. In keeping with
the present two acre zoning requirement, this does not provide any
more lots than the usual grid pattern.... However, by reducing
the lot size to less than one acre (26,400 square feet) and leaving
the rest of the land in its natural state, many advantages are
derived over the traditional subdivision pattern. 4 °
The Lower Gynedd Plan suggested several advantages of cluster
zoning:
-

the lots more easily fit the topography of the tract;

-

the most scenic areas, such as streams and knolls, are preserved;

-

the homeowner has less ground to maintain;

-

the homeowner feels less isolated;

-

the architectural pattern is more unified and interesting;

-

the open area can be used for tile fields for sewage where sewer
services are unavailable;
numerous costs usually attendant to the grid development
(streets, sidewalks, drainage structures, utility lines and land-

-

138. Huxtable, supra note 2.
139. N.A.H.B. Studies Land Use, The Sunday Bulletin (Philadelphia) 12 September 8, 1963; New Approaches to Residential Land Development, 40 U.L.I. TscH.
BULL. (1961); Huxtable, supra note 2, at 37; Density Zoning, 42 U.L.I. TEcH.
BULL. (1961).

140. Comprehensive Plan, supra note 53, at Appendix B, 151, 159-60.
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scaping) are reduced, and these savings can be passed onto
the home buyer;
there are less street intersections thereby creating safer environment for children.
The original draft of Title VII of the Housing Act of 1961 contained a section to promote cluster development by providing grants to
communities which encourage cluster zoning. These grants would have
amounted to ten percent of the cost of the open land. At the request
of the H.H.F.A., this section was deleted as unnecessary - clearly an
indication that clusters have been accepted when federal money is not
required to encourage it. 4 ' Finally, the F.H.A. has revised its minimum building requirements in terms of minimum ratios to encourage
42
subdividers to experiment with clusters.1
B.

Compulsory Dedication of Land or Paywent of Fees for Open Space Purposes.

Frequently local ordinances require that the open space which
is generated by the density procedure be dedicated to the public.
Developers evidently have shown a rare willingness to accept this
approach, probably because the public response to clusters has been
favorable.' 43 There has been little case law to date, but one New Jersey
case, Crinko v. South Brunswick PlanningBoard, upheld an ordinance
which allowed the developer to reduce minimum lot size 20-30% upon
deeding an equivalent percentage of the tract for parks, school sites
44
and other public purposes with the approval of the planning board.
The percentage of the tract which is dedicated to the community greatly
varies -

in some instances from 5% to as much as 93%.14" If the

local ordinance allows the planning board too much discretion, however,
it may be struck down.' 4 6
The builder who is forced to choose between minimum acre lots
and clusters might well argue that there is no justification for the large
141. WHYTF, op. cit. supra note 24, at 17 n.3.

142. Apartments in the Suburbs, A.S.P.O. INVORMATrON BULLETIN #187 (June
1964) ; Ward (unpublished paper for the University of Pennsylvania Law School Land
Use Seminar). See also Housing Act of 1961 § 233(a) : F.H.A. insured mortgages for
housing which tests experimental standards for neighborhood design.
143. Huxtable, supra note 2, at 42.
144. 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221 (1963) (but builder was not challenging
the cluster). But see Hiscox v. Levine, 31 Misc. 2d 151, 216 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805-806
(Sup. Ct. 1961). N.Y. TOWN LAW § 281 was amended to overcome the informities of
Hiscox v. Levine: (ch. 963 L. 1963).
145. SIUGEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 17; The Race for Open Space, supra note
91, at 56.
146. Cf. Swimming River G. & C.C. v. Borough of New Shrewsbury, 30 N.J. 132,
i52 A. 2d 135 (L. 1959) ; Evoy, Regulation of Residential Housing Developments (unpublished paper for University of Pennsylvania Law School Land Use Seminar)
(December 1963) ; Hiscox v. Levine, supra note 144.
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acre requirement and that it is merely a guise to force him to dedicate
a portion of his tract for open space without compensation. Several
states authorize compulsory reservation or dedication of land for park
purposes.' 47 Generally these statutes have been sustained, 4 ' but the
cases are clear that a community cannot require a subdivider to contribute land or donate funds for schools, parks or other places that are
to be used for the general public.' 49 However, a developer may be
required to assume costs which are specifically and uniquely attributable
to his activities. 50
The developer's attack has been more successful where the planning
commission required the payment of a fee to be used for land acquisition for or for recreation programs in lieu of land dedication. Such
requirements have been frequently struck down, primarily because of
poor legislative drafting of the enabling statute or ordinance. 5' New
York Town Law is illustrative. It provides:
Before the approval by the planning board of a plat..., such plat

shall also show in proper cases and when required by the planning
board, a park or parks suitably located for playground or other
recreational purposes. If the planning board determines that a suitable park or parks of adequate size can not be properly located in
any such plat or is otherwise not practical the board may require as
a condition to approval of any such plat a payment to the town of
an amount to be determined by the town board which amount shall
147. N.Y. TowN LAW § 277 (as amended L. 1959) ; ARK. STATS. ANN. § 19-2829
(Supp. 1959) ; CONN. GXN. STATS. ANN. § 8-25 (Rev. 1958) ; (as amended L. 1959) ;
MONT. Rev. CODE ANN. § 11-602 (1947). But see MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 41 § 81Q
(1961).
148. Cf. Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Pizarro v.
Planning Board, 69 P.R.R. 27 (1948); But see In re Lower Moreland Township,
81 D.&C. 387 (1951) (dictum - unconstitutional). Compare Ridgemont Dev. Co. v.
City of East Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 392, 100 N.W.2d 301 (1950) (narrowly construed
statute) with Matter of Lake Secor Dev. Co., Inc., 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y. Supp. 809
(1931), aff'd mem., 235 App. Div. 627, 255 N.Y. Supp. 853 (1932) (upheld ordinance
requiring dedication though state statute was less than compelling). See Comment,
Wis. L. R~v. 310 (1961); Reps, Control of Land Subdivisions by Municipal Planning
Boards, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 258, 269 (1955) ; Cutler, supra note 89; Note Subdivision
Control Requirement for Park Land, 12 SYRACUSE L. Rzv. 224 (1960).
149. Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Twp. of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d
40 (1961), aff'd, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A. 2d 226 (A.D. 1963) ; Rosen v. Village of
Downers Grove, 19 II. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
150. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, supra note 149; Pioneer Trust & Savings
Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 21 Ill. 2d 375, 175 N.E.2d 799 (1961). See discussion of this test as well as other cases and statutes relating to compulsory dedication of reservation of land and payment of fees in lieu of, in Reps and Smith, Control
of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUsE L. Rgv. 405, 407-412, 421-423 (1963).
151. Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961) (lack of specific
enabling legislation; no showing that money would be used for direct benefit of subdivision residents) ; Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, supra note 149. Compare
Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957) (funds used
for parks for entire public; not authorized by enabling statute), with City of Buena
Park v. Boyar, 8 Calif. Rep. 674 (1960) (fee authorized if improvement (drainage
ditch) directly benefited, though not located on plaintiff's subdivision). See also
Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962) ; City of
Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev, Co., 292 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1964). Cases are
discussed in Comment, Wis. L. R&v. 310 (1961).
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be available for use by the town for neighborhood park, playground
152
or recreation purposes including the acquisition of property.
Reggs Homes, Inc. v. Dickerson153 reaffirmed the validity of the
compulsory dedication provision (first sentence of section 277) but
held that without further authorization, the town could not require the
payment of fees in lieu of land. In response, the New York legislature
amended Town Law 277 in 1959 by adding the second sentence quoted
above. The Town of Newburgh by ordinance required a deposit of $50
per lot for the "future acquisition and/or for improvements of recreational facilities." In an action by a developer in Gulest Associates v.
Town of Newburgh,'5 4 the Supreme Court struck down the ordinance
and statute as violative of both the United States and New York constitutions. Since the statute did not restrict the neighborhood parks
to the subdivider's neighborhood, or strictly limit the recreation programs to the same area, the court found that the statute "compels a
landowner who proposes to subdivide to pay more than his proportionate share of the money to be spent on parks, playground and recreational facilities for the town as a whole."' 5 5 Furthermore, the phrase
"the board may require" was too vague, indefinite and uncertain since
standard. The
the board's discretion was limited by no ascertainable
56
decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division.'
As the Regional Plan Association concluded in respect to "in
lieu" payments,
Clear and uniform standards in subdivision regulations are important in the use of this technique. Developers should be put on
notice as to the circumstances under which such contributions
should be made and in what measure. The existence of such
standards linked with provision for public hearings and a master
plan would undoubtedly carry weight with courts in test cases. 5 C.

OrganizationalTcchniques for Holding Open
Space Generated by the Development

Once the developer has elected the cluster method of development,
he niust decide how the open space which is generated thereby is to be
owned and managed. 158 The simplest approach is dedication to a local
152. (As amended c. 846, L. 1959) § 277.
153. 16 Misc. 2d 732, 179 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
154. 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
155. Id. at 1007.
156. 15 A.D.2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962); criticized in Note, 75 HARV. L.
Rtv. 1622, 1628 (1962). See also ARK. STA'rs. ANN. § 19-2829 (Supp. 1959): Reps,
supra note 148; 12 SYRACUSt L. R~v. 224 (1960).
157. The Race for Open Space, op. cit. supra note 94, at 56.
158. See generally, KRASNOWIECKI, HomEs AssocIA'rTION STUDY (First Draft,
University of Pennsylvania Law School 1962). The developer will also wish to
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public authority. However, some prospective home-buyers would object
to the public nature of the open area and the attraction of "undesirables"
to it. Furthermore, they may be concerned that the local government
will not properly maintain the area. As a consequence, they may be
unwilling to pay as much for their land as they would if the open space
were privately owned and operated. The developer may attempt to
impose certain conditions on the transfer of title to the authority to
millify these criticisms. Unless there is adequate enabling legislation,
however, the municipal corporation may lack the power to accept such
a conditioned dedication.159 Furthermore, these conditions may not
necessarily bind the municipality. 6 ' One possible solution is the creation of a special park district. Such legislation has been enacted in

several states.1 61 There is no guarantee, however, that such districts
will not be consolidated, and, therefore, no longer restricted to a single
subdivision's residents. 6 2
An alternative to public dedication is ownership by a home owners'
association. While this approach has the advantages of local control
and privacy, lack of administrative expertise; potential tort liability;
unwillingness of owners to participate; and reluctance to pay association
assessments may pose serious limitations to this technique.
A typical association plan would subject each lot to a maximum
annual charge determined by the number of persons in a family who
use the park facilities, the area of the owner's lot, or in some instances
1 63
the market value of the owner's property.
Frequently problems of insufficient maintenance will arise. If the
land is dedicated to the public but limited to subdivision use, the courts
will uphold special assessments.'
If it is owned by the subdivision,
but that organization fails to properly maintain the open area, the local
public body would undoubtedly have the right under its police powers
to force individual owners to act.' 65
consider the possibility of obtaining a charitable deduction under the federal income
tax laws. The allowance of such a deduction may depend upon whether the land is
donated to a governmental body or a private home owners' association. See discussion
in footnote 173 infra.
159. City of Marquette Heights v. Vrell, 22 Ill. App. 2d 254, 160 N.E.2d 593

(1959).
160. Atlantic Beach Ass'n v. Hempstead, 3 N.Y.2d 434, 144 N.E.2d 409 (1957).

161. Bickley, The Provision for Open Space, Legal Basis & Procedure, 2 INSTIT.
-(1962); CALIF. GOV'T. CoDn §§ 61000-61934 (1955).
162. Atlantic Beach Ass'n v. Hempstead, supra note 160.
163. Such charges are often liens on the property. For a comprehensive agreement see the Radburn Association Declaration of Restrictions in DUNHAM, MODERN
RtAL ESTAT TRANSACTIONS 129-47 (1958).
164. Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U.S. 611, 18 S.Ct. 217 (1898) ; Bickley, supra
ON PLANNING & ZONING 47

note 198.

165. II McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPS. § 32.27 (power to require weed removal),
§ 30.18 (snow removal); CHROSTWAITe, ET. AL., PXNNA. MUNIC. ORDINANCES
277 (1954).
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A further drawback to the association device is the possibility that
the dues or assessments of the organization will be subject to the federal
excise tax. 166 If the issociation is operated exclusively for "pleasure,
recreation and other non-profitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inure to the benefit of a private shareholder," it is exempt
from income taxation under section 501(c) (7).Y7 Of course, if the
association derives outside income from the rental of its facilities, it
may lose its exempt status. 68 However, section 4241 imposes a twenty
percent tax on amounts paid as dues, and membership and initiation
fees to "any social, athletic or sporting club or organization." It first
appeared that if an organization received an income tax exemption
under section 501 (c) (4) (operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare), it would also be exempt from excise taxation.'"6 But
if it were exempted under section 501 (c) (7) (pleasure, recreation and
other non-profit purposes), it would be subject to section 4241 taxes as
a "social, athletic or sporting club."' ° It is now clear, however, that
whether the organization is qualified under 501 (c) (4) or 501 (c) (7)
is not controlling on the excise tax issue.17 ' If the association strictly
limits its function to maintenance, the organization should not be subject to excise taxes. For example, in Vecellio v. United States1 2 a
cooperative real estate venture was formed to create an artificial lake
and subdivide the surrounding land; the association neither maintained
recreational facilities nor sponsored any athletic or social events. The
court held that the organization was not subject to excise taxes.
V.

LOCAL REAL PROPERTY TAX CONCESSIONS

17 3

Local authorities have frequently sought to encourage the preservation of open space through real property tax abatement or deferral
schemes. In the past few years many states have enacted preferential
166. INT. Rev. CODP oF 1954 §§ 4241-4243 (but see various exemptions for skating
and swimming facilities - section 4243).
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (7)-1(a) (social clubs).
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (7)-l (b) ; Rev. Rul. 60-324, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 173.
169. Rev. Rul. 57-579, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 742.
170. For a full discussion of the excise tax problem, see KRASNOWIECKI, HoMES
ASSOCIATION STlUDY (First Draft) (1962).
171. Compare Rev. Rul. 63-214: § 501(c) (4) organization subject to excise tax,
with Engineers' Club of Los Angeles, 59-1 CCH 1959 STAND. FaD. TAX REP.
15,
362, 173 F. Supp. 934: § 501(c) (7) organization not subject to excise.
172. 196 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.W.Va. 1961).
173. It is possible that the developer who voluntarily dedicates part of his land
to a public authority for park purposes will be allowed a charitable deduction under
the federal income laws. Rev. Rul. 54-466, 1954-2 Cui. BULL. 93. See generally Lee,
Tax Treatment of Improvements Donated to the Public, 41 TAxEs 361 (June 1963).
The advantage of the charitable deduction (v. business expense) is that amount
deducted is the valuc at the time of contribution although greater 'than cost: Treas.
Reg. § .ii,--tc) ; Rev. Rul. 55-410, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 297. However, where a
dedication is required as a condition to plat approval, there can be no charitable
deduction for want of a gift, although allowed as part of the cost basis of the
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tax programs, and to date, they have not generally withstood court
action. It is well to explore these devices in some detail, because it can
be expected that they will play a major role in holding land in an open
state. The use of the tax power as an instrument of social policy comes
into direct conflict with the community's need for revenue. This fact
alone makes study of the merits critical. The use of taxes as an incentive has been attacked on these very grounds:
It seems to be part of our national psychological heritage to
consider property tax exemptions as an ideal means of promoting
worthwhile enterprises, dispensing charitable aid, furthering social
reforms, or showing esteem and gratitude. There is little or no
recognition of the fact that many of these objectives could be more
effectively, more economically, and more equitably achieved
through a direct and visible subsidy. Instead, however, we prefer
the devious, never-count-the-cost method of chiseling away at our
property tax base, in true devil-take-the-hindmost fashion ...
This process of granting exemptions feeds upon itself. As
more and more exemptions are granted, the tax burden becomes
higher upon the persons left to carry the load, so demands begin
to be heard for even more exemptions.'7 4
A brief review of local property tax history is perhaps in order
at this point. During the early 1900's most state constitutions were
remaining lots: Rev. Rul. 57-488, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 157-58. The Lower Gynedd
type of election between minimum acre and cluster zoning seems to be within that
ruling. See also Woodside Mills v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 356, 359-60 (W.D.S.C.
1958) (alternative holding), aff'd per curiam, 260 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Point
Pleasant Manor Building Co. v. Brown, 42 N.J. Super. 297, 126 A.2d 219 (A.D. 1956),
cert. den., 23 N.J. 140, 128 A.2d 309 (1957) ; Gardner v. Forest Lake Associates, Inc.,
131 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Crane-Berkeley v. Lavis, 238 App. Div. 124,
263 N.Y. Supp. 556 (1933). In any event serious valuation problems remain: R. B.
Dresser, 15 T.C. Memo 242 (Dec. 21,606(M) T.C, Memo 1956-54). At least it can
be said that a willing buyer "having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts in the
lowest market in which . . . [the developer] customarily sells" would be willing to
pay very little for land restricted to park uses: Treas. Reg. § 1.170-(c) (1).
Additional problems arise when title to the park land is donated to a home owners'
association. But it is possible that such an organization would qualify for the
charitable deduction: Isabel Peters, 21 T.C. 55 (1953), (Non-acq. withdrawn) 1955-2
CuM. BULL. 6; Rev. Rul. 59-310, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 146, 148, contribution to
foundation to provide beach and playground facilities allowed; a "public purpose
which tends to lessen the burdens of government." The biggest difficulty is that such
an association may not benefit an "indefinite number of persons." Compare, Isabel
Peters, supra; T. J. Moss Tie Co., 18 T.C. 188 (1952) (Non-acq.) appeal dismissed,
201 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Gimbel v. Commonwealth, 54 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931) ;
Havemeyer v. Commonwealth, 92 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1938), with Andrew Titles,
38 B.T.A. 545 (1938), aff'd on other issues, 113 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1940) ; Lake
Forest, Inc., 305 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1962), reversing 36 T.C. 510 (1961) and Rev.
Rul. 56-138, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 202.
The donation of scenic easements and development rights may qualify for a
charitable deduction: Rev. Rul. 64-205, I.R.B. 1964-30, 6; Mattie Fair, 27 T.C. 866
(1957) (Acq.) 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 4; note 137 supra.
174. Walker, Loopholes in State & Local Taxes, 30 TAX PoLicy 4 (Feb.-Mar.
1963). See also Kendrick, Property Tax Exemptions and Exemption Policies,

proceedings of the National Tax Association 84 (1958).
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amended to provide that "all taxation shall be equal and uniform."' '
Gradually there has been a trend toward classifying property by use,
7 6
and taxing accordingly, although less markedly for real property.'
There are presently more than 87,000 local government units in the
United States and practically all rely on the property tax. Real prop177
erty constitutes the third largest source of tax revenue in this country
($16.4 billion in 1960) or 88% of local collections.
Unfortunately,
there is widespread inequity in the method and rate of assessment. Tax
resources are unequally distributed among the taxing units; tax administrators are inexperienced and subject to political influence; and there
is incomplete information available on which to accurately base assessments.'Y7 Farmers have been particularly pressured by mounting real
estate taxes, especially those whose land is located in the path of impending development. Since the tax assessor must, in theory, base
his assessment on the market value of property, not limited to its agricultural use, taxes have often forced the farmer to subdivide prematurely. The direct result has been a drastic reduction in available
open space.'"
The legislatures of several states have responded to the farmer's
plight with alacrity. Some have required the assessor to consider the
value of the land without regard to its non-farm potential use. The
courts have frequently struck down this approach as violative of the
'uniform" tax clause of their state constitutions.'
For example, the
82
Maryland Court in State Tax Commission v. Gales' found the following provision an unconstitutional violation of the uniform taxation
clause of its Bill of Rights:
29

175. Walker, Land Use and Local Finance,Part III: Fiscal Aspects of Land Use,
POLICY 5 (July-August 1962).

TAX

176. See
TAXATION

NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY
CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATES FOR UNIFORMITY OF

(1959) ;

IN STATE
TAXATION

(Illinois Legislative Council, Publication 34) (1959).
177. Walker, supra note 175, at 10.
178. Haviland, Total Tax Collections in 1962, 31 TAX POLICY 8 (Jan. 1964).
179. Walker, supra note 175, at 7; Kendrick, The Assessment of Real Estate;
Recent Changes in the Provisions of 43 States, CORNELL UNIVERSITY EXTEN. BULL.
1041 (Reprint 1961).
180. Recreation and Open Space, supra note 15, at 161; WHYTE, op. cit. supra
note 24, at 5-10; Wershaw, supra note 84; HousE, STATE ACTION RELATING TO
TAXATION ON THE RURAL-URBAN FRINGE (Report

ture)

(1961) ;

ERS-13, U.S.

Dept. of Agricul-

HOUSE, PREFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT OF FARMLAND IN THE URBANRURAL FRINGE OF MARYLAND (Report ERS-8) (1961); Stocker, How Should We

Tax Farmlandin the Rural-Urban Fringe? Proceedings of the National Tax Association 463 (1961) ; 12 STANFORD L. REV. supra note 38, at 649, and cases cited therein;
PICKARD, CHANGING URBAN LAND USES AS AFFECTED BY TAXATION (U.LI.Research

Monograph 6)

(1962)

(extensive bibliography).

181. The Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution would seem to
permit reasonable classification: Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 119, 20 S.Ct. 284,
286 (1900). See Annot. - Taxation - Discrimination Favoring Farms, 111 A.L.R.
1486 (1937).
182. 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1959).
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Lands which are actively devoted to farm or agricultural use
should be assessed on the basis of such use, and shall not be
assessed as if subdivided or on any other basis."l 3
In response, the Maryland Constitution was amended to permit such
classification. 18 4 Attempts to classify real property by use have been
86 and Massachusetts ;11 7
1
declared invalid in New Jersey," 5 Ohio,'

upheld in Florida,' 8 Montana,8 9 South Dakota, 0' Iowa,' 9' and Delaware ;112 the situation in other states such as Pennsylvania'" and
Indiana"" remains unclear. A more defensible though more complex
method is the tax deferral scheme, similar in principle to the severance
tax which has been employed for many years to encourage conservation
of timber resources.' 9 5 Basically, it provides that the assessor evaluate
land both as to its agriculture and its potential non-farm use. The
farmer may elect the former valuation, but if he converts the land to
non-farm use, he is charged with the back tax differential. This
183. (c. 9, § 1(17) L. 1956) ; In re-enacting the farm assessment, the legislature
stated: "[it being the intent of the General Assembly that the assessment of farm
land be maintained at levels compatible with the continued use of such land for farming
and shall not be adversely affected by neighboring land uses of a more intensive
nature. The General Assembly hereby declares it to be in the general public interest
to encourage the preservation of open space as an amenity necessary to human welfare
and happiness, and to prevent the forced conversion of such open space to more
intensive uses as a result of economic pressure caused by the assessment of land at a
rate incompatible with the practical use of such land for farming." Art. 81 § 19(b)
(1961).
184. MD. DCLARATION OF RiGHTs, arts. 15 & 43 (1960).
185. Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 556, 585, 182 A.2d 841 (1962). But see the recent
constitutional amendment, note 198 infra.
186. Cf. State ex rel. The Park Investment Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 195 N.E.2d
908, 910 (Ohio 1964) ("[Tihere is no constitutional authorization for classification of
real property for taxation in relation to its nature or use. All property, whether
commercial, residential or vacant, must be assessed on the basis of the same uniform
percentage of actual value") (commercial property taxed at greater percentage than
other realty, mandamus to decrease upheld).
187. Cf. Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 342 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961).
188. Lanier v. Tyson, 156 S.2d 833 (Fla. 1963), reversing 147 S.2d 365 (Fla.
App. 1962). (But the majority opinions are confused and only the dissents meet the
real issues on both sides; the constitutional problem seems to have been avoided.) See
discussion of Florida, California, New Jersey and Maryland experiences in Wershaw.
Ad Valorem Taxation and its Relationship to Agricultural Land Tax Problems in
Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 521 (1964).
189. State ex rel. Lyman v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 1, 190 Pac. 129 (1920).
190. Great Northern Ry. v. Whitfield, 65 S.D. 173, 272 N.W. 787 (1937).
191. Dickerson v. Porter, 240 Ia. 383, 35 N.W.2d 66 (1948), appeal dismissed,
338 U.S. 843, 70 S.Ct. 88 (1949) ; Licht v. City of Burlington, 73 Ia. 29, 34 N.W.
494 (1887).
192. P.B. & W. R.R. Co. v. Mayor of Wilmington, 30 Del. Ch. 213, 57 A.2d 759
(1948), and cases cited therein at 224-25.
193. Compare HFammermill Paper Co. v. City of Erie, 372 Pa. 85, 92 A.2d 422
(1953), cert. den., 345 U.S. 940, 73 S.Ct. 831 (1953) ; Jermyn v. Scranton, 212 Pa. 598.
62 Ati. 29 (1905) ; and Coe v. Duffield, 185 Pa. Super. 532, 138 A.2d 303 (1958) with
Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Thomas, 336 Pa. 572, 9 A.2d 727 (1940).
194. IND. STATS. ANN. § 64-7119(b) (assessed as agricultural so long as such
use continues); 38 IND. L. Rgv. 72, 82-83 (1962) (doubt shed on non-uniform tax
assessments).
195. Luther v. McDermott, 265 N.Y. 47, 191 N.E. 770 (1939) (upheld timber
severance tax). Cf. Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Thomas, supra note 193 (void).
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method has been proposed, but not adopted in Massachusetts 9 8 and
California.' 97 It has been enacted in Hawaii, contingent on agricultural
zoning, 9 ' New Jersey 9 9 and Oregon." °0 Nevada provides that back
taxes becomes due whenever the land is sold, presumably even if it
were to remain in exclusively agricultural use.20 1 Strangely, the California voters approved tax abatement for golf courses20 2 but rejected
tax deferral for farmers.20 3 One critic of the California farm plan

suggested that it would have created a landed gentry. 4
Most commentators (other than farmers) prefer tax deferral to
tax abatement. Further, they suggest that the land be zoned as "0"
or agriculture, 20 5 or that the farmer be required to dedicate his development rights to the public. 2

6

While the property of those who have held

out from the tax scheme will be more valuable for development, this
enhanced value should be reflected in tax assessments. 0 7 Where development rights are dedicated to the public, the assessor should not value
the land for non-farm uses. 08
A.

Taxation of Land Restricted to Open Space Use

Land which is used for park purposes for the benefit of adjacent
property owners should not be taxable.20 9 Condominium legislation
assures that the value of park land will be taxed to the adjacent owners
rather than to the park owners association or the developer. Thirtythree states enacted condominium legislation in 1963.210
196.

See HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 687 (1959).
197. Legislature adopted such an approach but voters rejected a constitutional
amendment on Nov. 6, 1962; Haviland, Local Tax Legislation 1962-63, 30 TAX POLICY
3 (Feb.-Mar. 1963).
198. HAWAII REv. LAWS 1955 §§ 128-9.2 (Supp. 1963) (back taxes + 5% interest).
199. The Switz decision supra note 185 was overridden by a constitutional amendment: N.J. CONST. art. 8 § 1 (adopted by general election Nov. 5, 1963). See
N.J.S.A. 54: 4-23.1-54: 4-23.23 (c. 48 L. 1964) (2 year "roll back" of back taxes;
Farmland Assessment Act of 1964).
200. ORE. STATs. ANN. 308.370-395 (c. 577 L. 1963) (5 years back taxes + 6%
interest).
201. NEv. PROPERTY TAX §§ 361.313-14 (1963).
202. CALIF. CONST. art. XIII § 2.6 (1960).
203. Haviland, supra note 197.

204. Keith, The Assessor & A.C.A. 4, 30 THE

APPRAISAL JOURNAL

393 (1962).

205. E.g., Hawaii, supra note 198, at 769-70.
206. Stocker, supra note 180; WHYTE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 9.
207. But see Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 5, at 190.
208. See 4 OPIN. ST. COMPTR. 205 (New York 1948); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW
§ 2479(3) (1960).
209. SIEGEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 45; People ex rel. Poor v. Wells, 139 App.
Div. 83, 124 N.Y. Supp. 36 (1910), aff'd per curiam, 200 N.Y. 518, 93 N.E. 1129
(1910) ; Crane-Berkeley Corp. v. Lavis, 238 App. Div. 124, 263 N.Y. Supp. 556 (1933).
210. Haviland, supra note 197, at 4.
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VI.

SUMMARY

Open space is a term which encompasses a variety of land use
needs. As a result the planner will have to employ many different
techniques to acquire and preserve the desired open areas. Each of the
techniques has a number of inherent limitations which may seriously
affect the success of any community's open space program.
The most common tool is government purchase or condemnation
through eminent domain powers. It is best used where development
pressures are great, but the costs are often too prohibitive if used on
the large scale necessary to control the community's orderly growth.
Conservation "easements" are novel, hence, relatively untested.
What little experience there has been, has not been satisfactory, and
unless there is a complete appreciation for its legal intricacies, the results
are bound to be even less satisfactory. However, if properly employed,
they should be useful in slowing down urban sprawl, perhaps at less
cost to the community than purchase of the fee.
Professor Krasnowiecki's compensable regulation is a unique combination of regulation and acquisition. To some extent it possesses the
best and worst features of both. It is certainly the most promising new
approach that has been recently proposed.
Zoning remains the mainstay of most community planning programs and will continue to be for some time since local governments are
most familiar with its operations. Unfortunately, it has been used too
extensively, particularly in situations where compensation was clearly
owed to the regulated landowner. Some scheme should be provided
whereby development is arrested until the land can be acquired by the
community, with some provision for tax abatement or other forms
of compensation.
The cluster zone is an improvement over the minimum lot requirement which has fallen into recent disfavor with communities and legal
commentators. The existence of the cluster option should not, however, limit the developer's right to challenge the constitutionality of the
minimum lot size regulation. Fortunately, clusters are popular with
developers because they sell better than the standard grid pattern
of development.
Forced dedication of land or payment of fees in lieu of donation is
becoming increasingly popular to the dismay of many developers. The
fact that such ordinances are frequently voided by the courts attests to
the general lack of careful drafting and blatant unfairness to developers.
While the large development should be required to provide playgrounds
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and parks for its subdivision residents, adequate standards should be
provided to channel the zeal of the planning board.
The role of private covenants and gifts of land in preserving open
space has been given too little consideration. This is particularly true
in established residential areas which are faced with commercial encroachment. The Mill Creek and Lake George Park Commission plans
are encouraging examples of government technical and legal assistance
to homeowners who wish to preserve the natural beauty of their surroundings. These schemes should be carefully watched by planners.
Finally, preferential real property taxation devices are being
initiated in several states to protect farms from inflated taxes and the
resulting pressure to subdivide prematurely. While these purposes are
laudatory, the effects on unexempted property owners who are saddled
with increased taxes are often overlooked. This technique is most
shortsighted if not preceded by a thorough analysis of the real property
burden on the entire community. Certainly tax deferment with the
possible dedication of development rights is preferable to tax abatement
with no quid pro quo required.
The particular devices which are chosen will, of course, vary
with the political and economic climate of the individual community.
But before any open land preservation program is initiated, the planner
and lawyer must be certain that they are aware of the limitations of
the techniques which they ultimately select.
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